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Sport · Special report
Thirteen years, seven managers, £1.15bn of debt: the anatomy of Manchester United’s decline
Since Sir Alex Ferguson retired in 2013, Manchester United have spent tens of millions sacking managers, borrowed against their own future and handed a quarter of the club to Sir Jim Ratcliffe. Yet they sit 16th after Sunday’s 3-0 home defeat by Bournemouth. An empirical look at what went wrong, who is responsible and what must change.
The Atlantic Digest Manchester, 25 October 2026
Manchester United were humiliated 3-0 at Old Trafford by Bournemouth on Sunday, and the defeat captures the club’s decline better than any statistic. United had 62 per cent of the ball and 15 shots, yet only three of them were on target. They conceded twice in five minutes before half-time and finished the afternoon 16th in the Premier League, with one win and seven points from eight games. Five months ago, under Michael Carrick, they finished third and qualified for the Champions League. Thirteen years ago, under Sir Alex Ferguson, they were champions of England for the 20th time. They have not won the league since.
This report examines that decline empirically. It sets out the record of every manager since Ferguson, what each was paid to leave, the debt the Glazer family’s ownership has placed on the club, the record of Sir Jim Ratcliffe’s INEOS group since it bought into United in 2024, and the choices the club now faces.
A club that has not stood still, but has gone backwards
Under Ferguson, from 1986 to 2013, United won 13 league titles, two Champions Leagues, five FA Cups and four League Cups. Since he left, they have won two FA Cups, two League Cups and a Europa League. In 13 completed seasons, they have finished in the top two only twice, in 2017-18 and 2020-21, and on neither occasion were they within ten points of the champions. Their lowest point came in 2024-25, when they finished 15th, the club’s fewest top-flight points in more than half a century, and lost the Europa League final to Tottenham Hotspur.
Manchester United since Ferguson: season by season
| Season | Manager(s) | League finish | Trophies |
| 2013-14 | Moyes, Giggs (caretaker) | 7th | Community Shield (2013) |
| 2014-15 | Van Gaal | 4th | — |
| 2015-16 | Van Gaal | 5th | FA Cup |
| 2016-17 | Mourinho | 6th | League Cup, Europa League, Community Shield |
| 2017-18 | Mourinho | 2nd | — |
| 2018-19 | Mourinho, Solskjær | 6th | — |
| 2019-20 | Solskjær | 3rd | — |
| 2020-21 | Solskjær | 2nd | Europa League runners-up |
| 2021-22 | Solskjær, Carrick, Rangnick | 6th | — |
| 2022-23 | Ten Hag | 3rd | League Cup |
| 2023-24 | Ten Hag | 8th | FA Cup |
| 2024-25 | Ten Hag, Van Nistelrooy, Amorim | 15th | Europa League runners-up |
| 2025-26 | Amorim, Fletcher, Carrick | 3rd | — |
| 2026-27 | Carrick | 16th after 8 games | Out of League Cup |
Sources: Premier League records; club and media reports. 2026-27 position as of 25 October 2026.
The managers: records, trophies and why each one went
United have made seven permanent managerial appointments since 2013. The seventh is Carrick, who was appointed head coach in January 2026 and given a contract to 2028 in May. In between, the club has also used interim managers or caretakers: Ryan Giggs, Ralf Rangnick, Ruud van Nistelrooy, Carrick himself in 2021 and Darren Fletcher in January 2026. No permanent manager since Ferguson has lasted three full seasons.
Post-Ferguson managers: record in all competitions
| Manager | Tenure | Games | Won | Win % | Major honours |
| David Moyes | Jul 2013 – Apr 2014 | 51 | 27 | 52.9% | Community Shield |
| Louis van Gaal | Jul 2014 – May 2016 | 103 | 54 | 52.4% | FA Cup |
| José Mourinho | May 2016 – Dec 2018 | 144 | 84 | 58.3% | League Cup, Europa League, Community Shield |
| Ole Gunnar Solskjær | Dec 2018 – Nov 2021 | 168 | 92 | 54.8% | None |
| Ralf Rangnick (interim) | Dec 2021 – May 2022 | 29 | 11 | 37.9% | None |
| Erik ten Hag | May 2022 – Oct 2024 | 128 | 72 | 56.3% | League Cup, FA Cup |
| Ruben Amorim | Nov 2024 – Jan 2026 | 63 | 24 | 38.1% | None |
| Michael Carrick | Jan 2026 – present | — | — | — | None yet; 3rd in 2025-26 |
Sources: Yahoo Sports, Al Jazeera, The People’s Person. Figures vary slightly between sources depending on how penalty shoot-outs are counted.
David Moyes, hand-picked by Ferguson as his successor, lasted ten months. United were seventh when he was sacked on 22 April 2014, two days after a 2-0 defeat at his former club Everton ended any chance of Champions League qualification. His summer transfer window had produced only Marouane Fellaini after the pursuit of bigger targets failed. He was paid a reported £4.9m to £5.2m.
Louis van Gaal restored United to the Champions League in his first season, finishing fourth, and won the FA Cup in May 2016. He was sacked two days after that final. United had finished fifth and missed out on the Champions League, and his possession-heavy style was widely seen as joyless. His pay-off was about £8.4m.
José Mourinho was the most successful of the post-Ferguson managers by trophies, winning the League Cup and the Europa League in his first season and finishing second in 2017-18. His third season unravelled amid public rows with players and the board over recruitment, and he was sacked on 18 December 2018, two days after a 3-1 defeat at Liverpool left United sixth and 19 points off the top. United paid about £19.6m to him and his staff, which remains the club’s largest single managerial pay-off.
Ole Gunnar Solskjær, appointed as caretaker and then made permanent after a dramatic Champions League win in Paris in 2019, took United to third and then second. He also reached the 2021 Europa League final, which United lost on penalties to Villarreal. He was sacked on 21 November 2021, a day after a 4-1 defeat at Watford, with United seventh. His compensation was reported at between £9m and £10m.
Ralf Rangnick was hired as interim manager for the rest of the 2021-22 season, with a planned two-year consultancy role to follow. United finished sixth with 58 points, their lowest total of the Premier League era at the time, and the consultancy never materialised. The club later recorded £14.7m of costs linked to the change, although it said the sum was not paid solely to Rangnick and his staff.
Erik ten Hag won the League Cup in 2023, ending a six-year trophy drought, and the FA Cup in 2024, beating Manchester City in the final. But United finished eighth in 2023-24, their lowest league position since 1990. INEOS reviewed his position in the summer of 2024, decided to keep him, extended his contract and backed him with about £200m of signings. It then sacked him on 28 October 2024, 116 days after the extension, following a 2-1 defeat at West Ham United that left United 14th. The club’s accounts show £10.4m in costs for Ten Hag and his staff.
Ruben Amorim arrived from Sporting Lisbon in November 2024 as INEOS’s own choice of head coach. He insisted on a three-at-the-back system that the squad was not built for, and United finished 2024-25 in 15th place. He took them to the Europa League final in Bilbao, which they lost to Tottenham. He won 24 of his 63 matches, a win rate of 38.1 per cent, the lowest of any permanent manager since Ferguson, and collected 1.23 points per game in the Premier League. He was sacked on 5 January 2026, hours after publicly insisting that he had come to be the club’s “manager” and not its “head coach” and criticising the recruitment department led by director of football Jason Wilcox. United were sixth at the time. The club initially booked an exceptional cost of up to £16.7m for his departure, including staff. The final pay-off fell to £8.5m after he took over at AC Milan.
Michael Carrick, a former United midfielder, took over in January 2026 and lifted the team from sixth to third. That secured Champions League qualification and earned him a nomination for Premier League Manager of the Season, and on 22 May he signed a contract to 2028. This season has gone badly. United lost at newly promoted Hull on the opening day, were knocked out of the League Cup at home by Brighton after leading 2-0, and are now 16th after the defeat by Bournemouth. They have won one of eight league games, although they did beat Sabah 4-0 at home in the Champions League.
The cost of changing course
| Manager | Left | Trigger | Position | Reported cost to club |
| Moyes | 22 Apr 2014 | 2-0 loss at Everton; no Champions League | 7th | £4.9m–£5.2m |
| Van Gaal | 23 May 2016 | Missed Champions League despite FA Cup win | 5th (final) | £8.4m |
| Mourinho | 18 Dec 2018 | 3-1 loss at Liverpool; dressing-room rifts | 6th | £19.6m incl. staff |
| Solskjær | 21 Nov 2021 | 4-1 loss at Watford | 7th | £9m–£10m |
| Rangnick | May 2022 | Interim spell ended; consultancy dropped | 6th (final) | £14.7m related costs (not all to Rangnick) |
| Ten Hag | 28 Oct 2024 | 2-1 loss at West Ham, 116 days after extension | 14th | £10.4m incl. staff |
| Ashworth (sporting director) | 8 Dec 2024 | Left after five months | — | about £4.1m |
| Amorim | 5 Jan 2026 | Public clash over role and recruitment | 6th | £8.5m (up to £16.7m booked initially) |
Sources: Manchester United accounts and quarterly results as reported by Sky Sports, ESPN, Flashscore, Yahoo Sports, Football Transfers and EPL Index. Figures are reported estimates and differ between sources.
On the most conservative reading of those figures, United have spent roughly £65m on pay-offs to the six permanent managers they dismissed and their short-lived sporting director. That rises to about £80m once the Rangnick-related costs are included, before any of the transfer fees for players bought for one manager’s system and discarded by the next. Each change has brought a new tactical philosophy and a new set of signings. The result is a squad assembled by at least five different football leaderships.
The Glazers and the debt
The roots of the decline go back further than any manager. In 2005, the Glazer family bought United in a deal worth about £790m that was financed largely with borrowed money, much of which was then placed on the club itself. A club that had been debt-free has been servicing that borrowing ever since. Analysts at The ESK, an independent financial analysis site, estimate that United have paid about £850m in interest since 2005. Shareholders, overwhelmingly the Glazer family, also received about £166m in dividends between 2016 and 2022, before payments were suspended in late 2022.
The club’s accounts for the year to 30 June 2026, published on 23 September, show the scale of the burden. Revenue reached a record £677.6m, and adjusted earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation rose to £216.4m. But net finance costs jumped to £69.6m from £21.2m the year before, and United made a loss of £43m for the year. Long-term borrowings stood at $775m, or £577.6m, and the club had drawn £110m on its revolving credit facility. Cash was down to £67.2m.
Since then, United have borrowed a net £90m more to fund this summer’s transfers. Its filing with the New York Stock Exchange shows £120m drawn in July and August and £30m repaid in September. The BBC, which first reported the filing, put United’s total debt at about £1.15bn: £578m of long-term debt rooted in the Glazer takeover, £200m drawn on the revolving credit facility and £375m owed to other clubs in outstanding transfer fees.
Manchester United’s debt profile, autumn 2026
| Component | Amount | Notes |
| Long-term borrowings (Glazer-era debt) | £578m | $550m notes at 5.36% due 2031, plus a $225m term loan |
| Revolving credit facility | £200m | After a net £90m drawn since June 2026; facility limit £350m |
| Transfer fees owed to other clubs | £375m | Due within five years; down from £447m a year earlier |
| Total | about £1.15bn | Before any borrowing for a new stadium |
Sources: Manchester United FY2026 results and NYSE filing, as reported by BBC Sport and ReadManUtd; refinancing details from The ESK.
The cost of that debt is rising. In June 2026, United refinanced $425m of senior secured notes paying 3.79 per cent and due in 2027 with $550m of new notes paying 5.36 per cent and due in 2031. That pushed annual cash interest on the notes from about $16m to about $29.5m, according to The ESK. Because most of the debt is in dollars, every fall in sterling makes it more expensive. Money spent servicing debt is money that cannot be spent on players, the training ground or a stadium that has visibly deteriorated, with leaks in the roof, and United have had to borrow to compete in the transfer market.
INEOS: the rescue that has not yet rescued
Sir Jim Ratcliffe’s INEOS completed its purchase of a minority stake in February 2024, taking 27.7 per cent of the club for about £1.25bn. It raised that to 28.94 per cent by the end of 2024. Most of the money went to existing shareholders, chiefly the Glazers, rather than the club. INEOS did inject $300m of new capital into the club itself, $200m in February 2024 and $100m by December 2024, and took control of football operations. The Glazers retain control of the company, with Joel and Avram Glazer as co-chairmen.
INEOS brought in a new leadership team, with Omar Berrada as chief executive, Jason Wilcox as technical director and later director of football, and Dan Ashworth as sporting director, and it embarked on an aggressive cost-cutting programme. Supporters can point to some progress. Revenue is at a record, the wage bill has fallen to £302m, the training ground has been refurbished, United returned to the Champions League this season, and the club has a credible plan for a new stadium. But the list of costly errors is long.
The Ten Hag decision was the first. INEOS reviewed the manager in the summer of 2024, chose to keep him, extended his contract and spent around £200m on his recommended signings, then sacked him 13 games into the season. Ashworth, recruited from Newcastle after a protracted standoff over his release, left after five months at a cost of about £4.1m. Amorim, the coach INEOS chose to replace Ten Hag, was given a squad unsuited to his system and dismissed 14 months later. Two rounds of redundancies cost 322 jobs, and staff perks such as free lunches were removed. Ferguson’s paid ambassador role was ended. Ticket prices were raised to a flat £66 a match, with concessions for children and pensioners removed. The women’s team was moved into temporary cabins at Carrington, and hundreds of season-ticket holders were banned for alleged misuse of the ticketing system. Each decision could be defended on cost grounds, but together they alienated supporters and staff without producing better football.
The most important limit on INEOS is structural. As a minority shareholder, it runs the football but does not own the club. It cannot remove the debt, which sits with the company controlled by the Glazers, and it has invested heavily in a business whose largest owners continue to benefit from any rise in its value. Since August 2025, a drag-along clause has allowed the Glazers to sell the whole club, including INEOS’s shares, without Ratcliffe’s approval, although reports say the family has no current plans to sell.
The stadium question will test the arrangement further. United bought the land for a new 100,000-seat stadium beside Old Trafford this year and set out a masterplan for the stadium and the surrounding Trafford Wharfside district at an estimated cost of about £2bn. The club has not decided how to pay for it. Its stadium chief executive, Collette Roche, has said debt, equity, outside investors and naming rights are all being considered. More borrowing on top of £1.15bn would deepen the very problem that has held the club back for two decades.
Analysis: sell the club, or simply find the right manager?
The evidence of the past 13 years points to an uncomfortable conclusion: the manager has rarely been the main problem. Six permanent managers with very different philosophies, from Moyes’s pragmatism to Van Gaal’s possession, Mourinho’s control, Solskjær’s counter-attacking, Ten Hag’s pressing and Amorim’s back three, have produced broadly the same outcome. That outcome is a team that occasionally challenges for cups and a top-four place but has never seriously contested the title. Carrick’s achievement in taking the same squad from sixth to third in five months, followed by its collapse to 16th, shows how fragile any coaching gain is when the underlying structure is weak.
That structure has three faults. The first is ownership. A leveraged ownership model takes money out of the club every year in interest, and the split between Glazer control of the company and INEOS control of the football blurs accountability. The second is recruitment. Successive regimes have signed players for a particular coach, then changed the coach, leaving a squad with no coherent identity and £375m still owed to other clubs. The third is impatience. Every manager since Ferguson has been given less time than he needed, and almost every sacking has followed a single bad result rather than a long-term plan.
There are three broad options. The first is a full sale to a new owner willing to buy out the Glazers and pay off the acquisition debt. That would remove most of the £69.6m in net finance costs the club recorded last year, and it would give one owner clear responsibility. Qatar’s Sheikh Jassim bin Hamad Al Thani made an offer for the whole club in 2023 and was turned down. Any sale at the price the Glazers are likely to want would require a buyer of exceptional resources, and history shows that rich owners alone do not guarantee success. The second option is for Ratcliffe and INEOS to buy the Glazers out and take full control. That would end the split authority, but INEOS’s chemicals business has been reported to be under financial pressure, and its football record at United so far gives supporters little reason for confidence. The third is to keep the current arrangement and focus on getting the football structure right: a stable director of football, a coherent recruitment strategy and a manager given time.
On the evidence, the third option alone is not enough, but neither is a sale on its own. United need both. They need an ownership model that stops the club paying for its own purchase, and a football operation that picks a style, recruits for it and sticks with it through bad runs. The appointment of Carrick, a former player who understands the club and achieved results quickly, is a reasonable foundation. Whether he survives this autumn will show whether the club has learned anything from the last 13 years. If United sack another manager while £1.15bn of debt and a divided ownership remain unchanged, the pattern of this report’s tables is likely simply to repeat.
For millions of United supporters in Nigeria and across Africa, the decline has been felt every weekend. United remain one of the most widely followed clubs on the continent, with commercial deals that depend on that global audience. The club’s record revenue shows that the brand still sells. The question is how long that can last if the team keeps failing on the pitch.
Editorial note: Manager records are compiled from Yahoo Sports, Al Jazeera and The People’s Person and may vary slightly by source. Compensation figures are as reported from club accounts and media analysis, and in several cases include coaching staff. Financial figures are from Manchester United plc’s FY2026 results published on 23 September 2026 and the accompanying NYSE filing as reported by BBC Sport; refinancing and interest estimates are from The ESK and have not been independently verified against the 20-F filing. INEOS’s stake and investment figures are from club disclosures as reported. The analysis section reflects The Atlantic Digest’s assessment.










