November 16, 2026

Ukraine turns the tables at Lyman as Zelensky claims 10,660 Russian troops killed or wounded in a week

BREAKING NEWS: Kyiv says Operation Vivaldi is pushing Russian forces back in northern Donetsk as Ukrainian troops retake villages and employ drones, robots and remote mining; Moscow continues heavy attacks elsewhere while extraordinary casualty figures remain impossible to independently verify

By Atlantic Digest International & Defence Desk | Kyiv | September 28, 2026

Ukraine says its forces have killed or wounded 10,660 Russian soldiers in just one week while mounting a significant counteroffensive around Lyman in northern Donetsk, in what is emerging as one of Kyiv’s most important battlefield reversals of 2026.

President Volodymyr Zelensky announced the figure after receiving a battlefield briefing from Commander-in-Chief General Mykhailo Drapatyi, saying Ukrainian forces were producing “important results” in the Lyman sector under an offensive campaign known as Operation Vivaldi.

“The occupiers continue to be eliminated, and the designated objectives are being achieved,” Zelensky said.

He made an unusually specific assertion about the casualty count, saying that every Russian soldier included in Ukraine’s figure was supported by video confirmation.

The claim nevertheless remains a Ukrainian battlefield assessment.

Russia does not publish comprehensive current casualty data, and neither the total of 10,660 killed and wounded nor Kyiv’s assertion that each casualty has been visually documented has been independently verified.

There is also an important clarification to Zelensky’s statement.

The 10,660 figure does not refer exclusively to Russian losses around Lyman.

According to Zelensky, it represents Russian personnel killed or wounded across all active sectors of the Ukrainian front during the week.

Lyman is significant because that is where Ukraine says it has achieved some of its most important territorial results.

Zelensky identified the Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka and Lyman sectors as the three areas experiencing the heaviest fighting, while Ukrainian forces are also conducting operations in Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv and Sumy regions.

That distinction is essential.

Ukraine is not claiming to have eliminated 10,660 Russians at Lyman alone.

It is claiming that the Russian army suffered that number of killed and wounded across the active battlefield during a week in which the Lyman counteroffensive produced particularly important Ukrainian gains.

And on Monday morning, those gains appeared to be continuing.

Five more settlements reported under Ukrainian control

Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps announced on September 28 that its forces had liberated Nove, Ridkodub and Katerynivka and restored Ukrainian control over Karpivka and Novomykhailivka.

According to corps commander Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi, the latest phase of Operation Vivaldi recovered approximately 51 square kilometres.

Biletskyi described Nove as a particularly important Russian military hub in the sector.

The corps also claimed that Russian forces lost approximately 2,000 personnel during this phase of the operation and that Ukrainian troops captured more than 250 Russian soldiers.

Again, these are battlefield claims by the Ukrainian military and should be treated as such until independently corroborated.

But they follow earlier confirmed Ukrainian announcements pointing in the same direction.

On September 20, the 3rd Army Corps announced the liberation of Shandryholove and Derylove and said Ukrainian forces had established full control over Drobysheve.

Five days later, Zelensky said the Lyman operation was still underway and indicated that further positive developments were coming.

They now appear to be emerging.

The cumulative picture is increasingly significant.

Earlier in September, the 3rd Army Corps said it had cleared approximately 75 square kilometres and liberated another 10 square kilometres during counteroffensive operations in northern Donetsk.

More recent reporting on Operation Vivaldi put approximately 125 square kilometres back under Ukrainian control during earlier phases, including around 50 square kilometres recaptured from Russian occupation.

The precise territorial picture remains fluid because the fighting continues and Ukrainian commanders have deliberately restricted information about the operation.

But there is now substantial evidence that this is more than a raid or isolated tactical counterattack.

Ukraine appears to be attempting systematically to push Russian forces away from Lyman and disrupt Moscow’s ability to establish the positions required for another offensive towards the western Donbas.

Why Lyman matters

Lyman is not simply another small eastern Ukrainian city.

Its importance comes from geography.

The city sits in northern Donetsk Oblast near the boundary with Luhansk and close to the approaches towards Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, two of the most important Ukrainian-held cities remaining in Donetsk.

The wider Lyman sector also connects the northern Donbas battlefield with fighting towards Siversk, Kreminna and the forests along the Siverskyi Donets.

Control of the road and rail network around Lyman affects the movement of troops, ammunition, fuel and equipment.

That makes the area valuable to both armies.

Russia captured Lyman in May 2022.

Ukraine retook it in a major counteroffensive in October of the same year.

Since then Moscow has repeatedly attempted to push westwards again.

A successful Russian breakthrough through the Lyman axis could increase pressure on the Ukrainian defensive belt protecting Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

For Kyiv, pushing Russian forces eastward achieves the opposite.

It creates greater defensive depth around those cities.

It forces Moscow to expend troops recovering lost positions.

It disrupts Russian preparations for another offensive.

And potentially most importantly, it changes the battlefield initiative.

Zelensky made precisely that argument.

“Every such week on the front that becomes ours – Ukrainian – in terms of the overall situation prevents Russia from mounting greater offensive activity against Ukraine,” he said.

That may be the strategic purpose of Vivaldi.

Ukraine does not necessarily need to launch another enormous counteroffensive comparable to 2022.

It can instead conduct concentrated local offensives against vulnerable sections of the Russian line, forcing Moscow to commit reserves and preventing Russian commanders from concentrating overwhelming manpower elsewhere.

Operation Vivaldi

Ukraine has released relatively little detail about the full architecture of Operation Vivaldi.

That is deliberate.

Biletskyi has said the operation is being conducted under conditions of maximum information silence.

What has emerged, however, suggests Ukraine is experimenting with a form of warfare built around far greater integration between infantry, aerial drones and unmanned ground vehicles.

One of the most striking innovations disclosed by the 3rd Army Corps involves using heavy aerial drones to transport explosive ground robots deep behind Russian positions.

According to Biletskyi, Ukrainian heavy bomber drones have carried unmanned ground systems more than 10 kilometres behind Russian lines.

Once delivered, those ground drones can scout positions, attack troops or equipment, interfere with logistics and prepare the battlefield before Ukrainian infantry advances.

The corps says its unmanned systems have completed more than 15,700 missions, moved approximately 3,300 tonnes of cargo and attacked Russian command and logistics infrastructure.

Ukraine has also disclosed another use of robotic warfare around Lyman: remote mine laying.

According to Ukrainian reporting, 3rd Army Corps units used ground robotic systems during Operation Vivaldi to create approximately 400 metres of mine barriers over two nights.

The tactical logic is important.

Minefields can restrict Russian reinforcement routes.

Drones can observe those routes.

Artillery and FPV drones can then attack troops forced into predictable corridors.

Ground robots can perform dangerous missions that previously required Ukrainian soldiers to expose themselves.

The result is an attempt to increase Russian casualties while reducing Ukrainian exposure.

That does not make infantry unnecessary.

Territory still has to be physically occupied and defended by soldiers.

But Ukraine is increasingly attempting to make machines perform the most dangerous parts of the approach.

Is that why Russian casualties are so high?

Possibly in part.

But Zelensky’s 10,660 figure needs perspective.

If accurate, it would represent an average of more than 1,500 Russian soldiers killed or wounded every day for seven days across the entire front.

That is an extraordinary attrition rate.

Ukraine says the figure is supported by battlefield video.

Russia has not independently confirmed anything approaching it.

There is no neutral organisation capable of counting battlefield casualties in real time across a front hundreds of kilometres long.

Both governments have incentives to emphasise enemy losses while limiting disclosure of their own.

Independent casualty research therefore generally moves much more slowly.

Mediazona and associated researchers, for example, use obituaries, family announcements, local-government statements and other public records to identify individual Russian dead. As of September 21, their database had identified more than 258,000 Russian military deaths since the full-scale invasion began, while stressing that the true number is considerably higher because public-source confirmation inevitably lags behind battlefield deaths.

Western assessments have also put total Russian casualties — killed and wounded combined — far above the independently name-confirmed death count.

Ukraine’s General Staff, meanwhile, said earlier this month that Russian forces had suffered more than 300,000 killed and wounded during 2026 alone and more than 1.5 million personnel losses since February 2022. Those are Ukrainian estimates and are substantially higher than independently verified fatality counts.

The safest conclusion is therefore not that 10,660 has been independently established as fact.

It has not.

It is that Russia continues to absorb very large personnel losses while sustaining offensive operations, and that Ukraine believes the latest week was particularly costly for Russian formations.

Signs of Russian problems around Lyman

There are indications beyond Ukrainian government statements that Russian forces have encountered difficulties in the sector.

The Institute for the Study of War reported earlier in September that Russian military bloggers themselves were acknowledging Ukrainian counterattacks around Lyman and criticising misleading Russian military reporting about the situation.

That matters because Russian military bloggers frequently have connections to troops and commanders at the front and sometimes acknowledge setbacks before the Russian Defence Ministry does.

There have also been Ukrainian reports citing the ATESH resistance movement that some Russian State Duma deputies were preparing an appeal concerning extremely heavy Russian losses around Lyman.

Those claims have not been independently verified and should not be treated as confirmation that the Russian parliament is formally demanding withdrawal.

But their emergence illustrates the scale of the information battle surrounding the sector.

More important than rumours from Moscow is what is happening on the ground.

Ukraine is naming villages it says it has recaptured.

Russian assaults continue.

And the front line appears to be moving in Ukraine’s favour locally.

Russia has not stopped attacking

The Ukrainian advance should not be mistaken for a general Russian collapse.

Russia continues offensive operations elsewhere along the enormous front.

Ukraine’s General Staff reported 197 combat engagements on September 27.

The most intense fighting continued around Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka and Lyman.

On the Lyman axis itself, Ukrainian forces reported repelling Russian attempts to advance around Zarichne, Lyman and Dibrova.

Around Kostiantynivka, Ukraine reported approximately 20 Russian assaults.

Another 15 were reported around Pokrovsk.

Fighting was also recorded around Huliaipole and the Oleksandrivka sector.

That illustrates what makes the current Ukrainian operation unusual.

Ukraine is attacking around Lyman while simultaneously defending against Russian offensives elsewhere.

Zelensky described this as active defence.

The phrase sounds contradictory but describes an increasingly important Ukrainian doctrine.

Instead of simply remaining inside trenches waiting for Russian assaults, Ukrainian forces counterattack where they identify weakness, attempt to recover tactically useful ground and force Russian commanders to react.

Operation Vivaldi appears to be the most developed example of that approach.

Meanwhile Russia is attacking Ukraine from the air

The battle around Lyman is occurring alongside another war increasingly detached from the physical front line.

Russia continues its long-range drone and missile campaign against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.

During the latest overnight attacks, Ukraine said Russia launched 170 Shahed-type attack drones and other UAVs, including 76 jet-powered versions.

Ukraine’s Air Force claimed that 147 were shot down or electronically suppressed.

Impacts were recorded at 18 locations.

Across Ukraine, authorities reported at least 14 people killed and 57 injured in Russian attacks over the reporting period.

Odesa suffered what regional officials described as a mass strike.

Russian attacks also hit Kyiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Poltava, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhzhia and other areas.

Residential buildings, medical facilities, energy infrastructure, shops and grain storage were among the reported targets or damaged sites.

Ukraine, meanwhile, continues striking Russian territory.

Kyiv has intensified attacks against oil refineries, fuel depots, military-industrial plants and logistics infrastructure inside Russia.

The strategy is designed to attack the economic and logistical system supporting Moscow’s war.

But it has become diplomatically sensitive.

US President Donald Trump has urged Zelensky to stop attacks against Russian refineries because of concerns that they are worsening global oil shortages and prices at a time when the Iran war has already severely disrupted shipments through the Strait of Hormuz.

Zelensky has offered to stop striking Russian energy infrastructure if Moscow stops attacking Ukraine’s energy system.

No comprehensive agreement has yet followed.

Lyman and the wider Russian strategy

Russia’s overarching objective in eastern Ukraine remains the capture of the remainder of the Donbas that it does not already control.

That means the Lyman operation must be viewed alongside battles around Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

Russian commanders face a basic problem if Ukraine’s counteroffensive around Lyman continues.

Every additional Russian brigade or regiment moved towards Lyman to stabilise the front is a formation that cannot simultaneously be concentrated somewhere else.

Reserves are finite.

Equipment is finite.

Experienced infantry is particularly finite.

Russia possesses a much larger mobilisation base than Ukraine and has demonstrated a willingness to accept heavy losses.

But manpower superiority only produces operational advantage when troops can be concentrated.

Ukraine’s apparent objective is to prevent that concentration.

That explains Zelensky’s statement that successful Ukrainian weeks prevent Moscow from undertaking “greater offensive activity.”

Ukraine does not necessarily have to destroy the Russian army.

It has to keep forcing it to respond.

But this is not yet another Kursk or Kharkiv breakthrough

The temptation will be to describe Operation Vivaldi as a dramatic Ukrainian breakthrough.

The evidence does not yet justify going that far.

The territory recovered is meaningful locally.

The reported liberation of several settlements matters.

The claimed Russian losses are very large.

The use of robotic warfare is noteworthy.

And Ukrainian forces appear to possess tactical momentum around Lyman.

But the scale remains far below Ukraine’s September 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive, when Russian lines collapsed across thousands of square kilometres.

There is no evidence at present of a comparable systemic collapse.

Russian forces remain capable of counterattack.

They continue launching large numbers of drones.

They continue assaulting Ukrainian positions elsewhere.

And Moscow retains substantial manpower and firepower advantages.

The more accurate description is that Ukraine appears to have seized the initiative on an important section of the eastern front and is exploiting it aggressively.

Whether it becomes something larger depends on what happens next.

The next Russian decision

Moscow now has several choices.

It can reinforce Lyman heavily.

That could slow or stop the Ukrainian advance but would consume troops needed elsewhere.

It can attempt to counterattack immediately.

That risks further losses if Ukrainian drone and artillery networks have already prepared the battlefield.

It can concede some tactically unfavourable positions and establish another defensive line farther east.

Or it can increase pressure elsewhere in an attempt to force Ukraine to transfer forces away from Lyman.

The last option would be entirely consistent with the wider nature of this war.

If Russia cannot stop Ukraine directly around Lyman, it may try to create crises around Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv or Sumy and force Kyiv to choose which front receives reinforcements.

That makes Zelensky’s disclosure that he and Drapatyi have already agreed on “further active steps” particularly interesting.

Ukraine clearly does not want Moscow to know where those steps will occur.

The political timing matters

There is also a diplomatic dimension.

Zelensky’s announcement came immediately after a week of high-level diplomacy around the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

Ukraine needs continued Western weapons, financing, intelligence and air defence.

Battlefield success strengthens Kyiv’s argument that military assistance is producing results.

A Ukrainian army that appears only to be retreating faces a more difficult political argument in Washington and European capitals.

An army demonstrating that it can regain territory presents a different proposition.

That does not mean Operation Vivaldi was launched for political theatre.

The military logic around Lyman is clear.

But its success inevitably affects Ukraine’s diplomatic position.

It allows Zelensky to argue that Russia’s battlefield superiority is not inevitable and that Moscow can still be pushed backwards when Ukrainian forces possess the necessary weapons, technology and operational freedom.

Technology is becoming Ukraine’s substitute for manpower

Perhaps the most important lesson from Lyman may ultimately have less to do with the villages themselves than with how Ukraine is fighting for them.

Ukraine has a manpower problem.

Russia has a larger population.

It can recruit and mobilise more soldiers.

Kyiv therefore needs to make each Ukrainian soldier more effective while exposing fewer troops to Russian fire.

That is where drones and robotics become strategically important.

Ukraine has already transformed FPV drones from improvised weapons into one of the principal killing systems on the battlefield.

Operation Vivaldi suggests the next stage may be the integration of aerial drones, ground robots, remote mines, electronic warfare, reconnaissance systems and conventional infantry into a single tactical network.

A drone sees the Russian position.

Another drone attacks it.

A ground robot approaches.

Remote mines cut the reinforcement route.

Artillery strikes identified targets.

Electronic warfare interferes with Russian drones.

Only then does infantry move.

That is not completely unmanned warfare.

It is warfare designed to keep human soldiers farther from the most dangerous parts of the battlefield.

If Ukraine can scale that model, its significance extends far beyond Lyman.

The casualty question remains central

Zelensky’s 10,660 figure will attract the largest headlines.

It should not obscure the more measurable battlefield development.

Ukraine is taking ground.

Settlements that had been contested or under Russian control are being reported back under Ukrainian control.

Russian forces are being forced to respond.

The Ukrainian operation has continued through multiple phases rather than ending after a single counterattack.

And Russian sources have acknowledged Ukrainian pressure in the sector.

Those developments can be evaluated independently of whether the exact casualty figure eventually proves accurate.

The distinction matters because casualty estimates in this war are notoriously difficult.

A wounded soldier may return to service.

A soldier initially reported missing may later appear.

Drone footage may show a strike without conclusively establishing whether a soldier was killed, wounded or escaped.

The same incident can potentially appear in reports from multiple units.

Both sides operate under wartime information restrictions.

For those reasons, precise real-time casualty figures should always be treated cautiously.

Ukraine’s assertion that it possesses video confirmation for every one of the 10,660 losses is unusually strong.

If Kyiv eventually releases sufficient evidence, the claim will become easier to assess.

Until then, it remains Ukraine’s official estimate.

A battlefield that may be changing again

For much of 2026, the central question surrounding the eastern front has been how far Russia could advance and how much territory Ukraine could afford to trade while exhausting Russian forces.

Operation Vivaldi introduces another possibility.

Ukraine may again be capable of creating local offensive superiority even without possessing overall numerical superiority.

The difference is important.

Kyiv does not need superiority everywhere.

It needs superiority at the right place, for the right period, against the right Russian formations.

Lyman may be demonstrating how that can be achieved.

Concentrate elite formations.

Flood the battlespace with drones.

Use robotic systems to reduce human exposure.

Attack logistics.

Mine reinforcement routes.

Exploit inaccurate Russian assessments of the front.

Take tactically important settlements.

Then force Moscow to decide whether to sacrifice more troops to recover them.

That appears to be the logic behind Operation Vivaldi.

What happens next

The next several days will establish whether Ukraine has reached the natural limit of the Lyman counteroffensive or whether Russian defensive positions remain vulnerable farther east.

The key indicators will be straightforward.

Can Ukraine hold the villages it has retaken?

Can Russian forces organise an effective counterattack?

Does Moscow transfer significant reserves towards Lyman?

Does Ukraine expand the operation towards another sector?

And can Kyiv sustain its current casualty advantage without exhausting its own best assault formations?

Those questions are more important than any single daily map.

Because Ukraine’s real objective is not simply to colour several additional villages blue.

It is to alter Russia’s military calculations.

Zelensky’s statement suggests Kyiv believes that process has begun.

More than 10,000 Russian soldiers killed or wounded in one week would, if ultimately substantiated, represent a severe rate of attrition.

But even without accepting that number unquestioningly, the territorial developments around Lyman indicate that something consequential is occurring.

Ukraine is no longer merely defending that part of Donetsk.

It is attacking.

It has recovered ground.

It says Russian troops are surrendering in significant numbers.

Its commanders are using drones and ground robots in increasingly integrated ways.

And this morning another five settlements were reported under Ukrainian control.

Russia remains the larger military.

It continues attacking elsewhere.

It retains formidable missile, drone and manpower resources.

There is no evidence that its entire eastern front is collapsing.

But around Lyman, the direction of movement has changed.

For months, the central battlefield question was how much farther Russia could advance.

Operation Vivaldi has introduced a different question: how much ground can Ukraine take back before Moscow finds the forces necessary to stop it?

That is why Zelensky’s announcement matters beyond the headline number of 10,660 Russian casualties.

The important development is not simply how many Russian soldiers Ukraine says it has eliminated.

It is that, on one of the most strategically important approaches to the remaining Ukrainian-held Donbas cities, Russian troops are being pushed in the wrong direction.

Atlantic Digest — Navigating the Complexities of Our World.