November 6, 2026

‘Not quaking in his suede loafers’: The Economist’s viral verdict on Tinubu — unpopular, defiant, and on course to win again

The Atlantic Digest | Lagos, Nigeria — October 2, 2026

In a stinging but analytically precise assessment that has gone viral across Nigerian social media and political circles, The Economist — the influential London-based weekly regarded as one of the world’s most authoritative journals of political and economic analysis — has delivered a verdict on President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s re-election prospects that is as paradoxical as it is damning.

The headline tells the story: “Nigerians Dislike Their President, But May Re-Elect Him Anyway.”

The magazine’s sub-deck puts the central irony of Nigeria’s 2027 electoral moment in sharp relief: “That Nigeria’s unpopular president is not quaking in his suede loafers ahead of the next election says less about him and more about the country’s complicated electoral dynamics.”

Published on October 1, Nigeria’s 66th Independence Day — hours after Tinubu delivered his own “age of prosperity” address and Atiku Abubakar fired back with a sharp rebuttal — The Economist’s piece could not have landed at a more charged political moment. By Friday morning, it had been shared thousands of times across X, WhatsApp and Facebook, generating fierce debate in a country with fewer than 100 days until its January 16, 2027 presidential election.

The opening image: a president unbothered by his own unpopularity

The piece opens on a scene that is itself a political statement. On September 29, just two days before Independence Day, Tinubu returned to Nigeria from Paris — after a month-long stay in Europe that had already extended well beyond its original schedule, raising eyebrows at home and drawing mockery from the opposition. He had previously been reported to have spent approximately 261 days abroad since taking office, at a cost reportedly exceeding ₦37.64 billion to Nigerian taxpayers.

The Economist frames Tinubu’s equanimity — his apparent lack of concern about any of this — as the central puzzle of its analysis. On the face of it, a president who has just returned from a month in Europe while his country endures its worst cost-of-living crisis in living memory should be politically vulnerable. He is not. Or at least, he is not behaving as if he is.

“On the face of it, Mr Tinubu’s cool is surprising,” the piece states.

It then sets out, methodically, the full scale of what that cool is absorbing — and the structural reasons why it has not, so far, translated into a genuinely existential electoral threat.

The misery: Borno as a window into Nigeria’s crisis

The Economist takes readers to Borno State in Nigeria’s north-east as a case study in the human cost of the current administration’s record — a deliberate choice, because Borno is both one of Nigeria’s most politically significant states and one of its most deeply afflicted.

Borno has been at the epicentre of the Boko Haram and ISED insurgency for over a decade. It has been internally displaced, economically devastated and repeatedly promised security improvements by successive administrations. In 2023, Tinubu won 54% of the vote in Borno — a remarkable performance for a Yoruba Muslim from Lagos in a north-eastern state, achieved largely through the structural leverage of the APC and the support of Borno’s political establishment.

But in 2026, the picture is markedly different. The Economist reports that Tinubu’s reforms — the subsidy removal, the naira devaluation, the restructuring of the exchange rate — have, when combined with a lean harvest, cuts in international aid, and rising energy prices driven by the wars in Ukraine and Iran, made life materially harder in the north-east. Where the macro-economic data shows inflation falling and government revenue rising, the lived experience in places like Maiduguri tells a different story.

Recent polling by SBM Intelligence, a Lagos-based risk-advisory firm, tells a stark story: Tinubu now has a negative favourability rating of minus 58.5 nationally — the worst of any presidential candidate in the field. In Borno specifically, he is now less popular than both Peter Obi of the NDC and Atiku Abubakar of the ADC, the two main challengers. In 2023, he won Borno. In 2026, he trails in it.

As the magazine notes, this matters enormously — because the north has traditionally been the region where APC dominance has been most firmly entrenched, and a collapse in northern support could unravel the electoral coalition that put Tinubu in power three years ago.

And yet — here is the paradox that structures the entire article — that collapse in support may still not be enough to remove him.

Why unpopularity may not be enough: the five structural factors

The Economist’s analysis identifies five interconnected factors that it argues could preserve Tinubu’s hold on the presidency despite his deep unpopularity.

1. The opposition is splintered — and Tinubu has benefited from that splitting

This is the most structurally decisive factor. In 2023, Tinubu won the presidency with just 37% of the vote — because the opposition was divided between Atiku Abubakar (29%), Peter Obi (25%) and Rabiu Kwankwaso (6%). Their combined vote share exceeded 60%. Had any two of them been on the same ticket, the arithmetic would almost certainly have produced a different result.

The situation in 2027 is broadly analogous. Despite months of coalition talks — which produced what was billed as a broad opposition front — the alliance has fractured. Peter Obi and Kwankwaso left the Atiku-dominated ADC to run under the NDC. Atiku and Obi are running separately. The anti-APC vote, as one analyst put it to the magazine, is not coalescing into a single vote.

“Because it’s not a united ticket, that anti-APC vote is not coalesced into a single vote,” Joachim MacEbong of Control Risks told The Economist.

The arithmetic from 2023 persists: if Atiku and Obi split the opposition vote between them in roughly equal proportions, and Tinubu consolidates his incumbent advantage in the APC’s structural strongholds, the president can win with a plurality even if a majority of Nigerians would prefer someone else.

2. Incumbency advantage and the power of the ruling machinery

The Economist notes that incumbents in Nigeria have historically had significant advantages — access to the ruling party’s machinery, the patronage networks of the federal government, and, in the magazine’s words, “plentiful cash to dole out goodies.” This is not a new observation about Nigerian electoral politics, but it is a durable one. The federal government controls billions of naira in transfers to states, appointments to thousands of positions, contracts worth hundreds of billions, and a security apparatus that can be directed toward electoral purposes.

Tinubu, who is one of the most experienced political operators in Nigeria’s modern history and who has spent decades building and deploying political structures, is not a passive recipient of incumbency advantage. He is an active and skilled maximiser of it.

3. The Muslim-Muslim ticket: religion as a structural electoral cushion

Perhaps the most counter-intuitive element of The Economist’s analysis is its assessment of the Muslim-Muslim ticket — the decision by Tinubu to retain Vice President Kashim Shettima, a former governor of Borno State and a northern Muslim, on his ticket for 2027. This was controversial in 2023. It remains controversial in 2026. But The Economist reports that it may be working in ways that critics underestimate.

“The fact that the president has stuck with the Muslim-Muslim ticket resonates with quite a number of people,” Cheta Nwanze, the chief executive of SBM Intelligence, told the magazine.

The logic runs as follows: Nigeria’s electoral arithmetic gives enormous weight to the north, where Muslims constitute a majority. A ticket of two Muslims — one Yoruba from the south-west, one Hausa-Fulani from the north-east — creates a direct appeal to Islamic identity that cuts across the regional and ethnic divisions that have historically fragmented the northern vote. The fact that Shettima is specifically from Borno adds a layer of local legitimacy in the very region where Tinubu’s personal popularity has declined most sharply.

The counter-argument, made by Atiku’s camp and by many analysts, is that the Muslim-Muslim ticket alienates Christian voters — particularly in the south-east and the Middle Belt — who represent a significant bloc. But The Economist’s framing suggests that, as a mobilising tool in the north specifically, the ticket may be more effective than its critics concede.

4. Political cynicism: low expectations as a form of political immunity

One of the most penetrating observations in The Economist’s piece is also one of the most dispiriting. The magazine reports that in Maiduguri — the capital of Borno, one of Nigeria’s most conflict-affected cities — some voters say they do not even know who else is on the ballot besides Tinubu. In a country with 18 presidential candidates, this is a remarkable statement about information access and political engagement in the most affected communities.

More fundamentally, the magazine quotes an insight from its northern reporting that cuts to the heart of the cynicism problem: voters in the north may not be too concerned by Tinubu’s record because they already expect little from the government.

This is the darkest element of the electoral paradox. When expectations have been ground down by decades of poverty, insecurity and broken promises to the point where citizens have decoupled their voting decisions from any assessment of governance performance, incumbents become paradoxically more secure. You cannot disappoint someone who expected nothing. And a voter who expects nothing from any government has no particular reason to take the risk of changing the one that is at least familiar.

The Economist quotes one mother in Maiduguri who says she will vote for Tinubu as a “thank you” for medicine at the government hospital — a single, tangible, personal experience of government delivery that has lodged more deeply than any macro-economic argument or opposition critique.

5. The Obi problem: religious identity and the limits of favourability

Peter Obi of the NDC has a net favourability rating of plus 58.3 — a striking contrast to Tinubu’s minus 58.5. He won in Lagos in 2023, defeating Tinubu in the president’s own stronghold. He has a powerful youth following and has generated genuine excitement across multiple demographics.

But The Economist identifies a structural ceiling on Obi’s support that is deeply uncomfortable for Nigerian progressives: he is a Catholic. And even voters who genuinely prefer him in the north — where the election will ultimately be decided — may rule him out on religious grounds. His Muslim running-mate, Senator Kwankwaso, may not be sufficient to bridge that gap in a country where religious identity remains one of the most powerful determinants of northern voting behaviour.

“Even voters who like Mr Obi may rule him out because he is a Catholic,” the magazine states. “The fact that he has a Muslim running-mate may not be enough.”

The re-election pitch: reform as legacy, reform as risk

Tinubu’s own re-election argument is, in essence, a request for patience combined with a claim that the worst is over. The “From Reform to Prosperity” theme of his Independence Day address captures this precisely: the work of correction has been done, the rewards are beginning to materialise, and what Nigeria needs is continuity to see those rewards fully realised.

The Economist acknowledges that there is substance to parts of this claim. Inflation has fallen, government revenue is rising and investment is picking up. The structural corrections to the exchange rate and the subsidy regime have created macroeconomic conditions that international investors find more predictable and manageable than the dysfunction they replaced.

But the magazine’s reporting in Borno illustrates the gap between that macro-level stabilisation and the micro-level experience of ordinary Nigerians. The combination of reform-driven price increases with a lean harvest, international aid cuts and rising energy prices has produced conditions that feel, in the communities most affected, less like a painful but necessary correction and more like a compound crisis.

The key question for January 16, 2027, is which of those two realities — the macro narrative of gradual stabilisation or the micro reality of deepening hardship — will dominate the choices Nigerians make in the polling booth.

Why this report has gone viral

The Economist’s analysis has struck a nerve not because it says something entirely new but because it says something Nigerians have been circling around in their own political conversations — and says it with the authority of an outside observer who has no political stake in the outcome.

The response on social media has ranged from vigorous agreement — from those who see the analysis as a sober, accurate assessment of how electoral systems can produce outcomes that contradict popular will — to vigorous disagreement, from those who argue that the magazine is underestimating the depth of public anger, the possibility of a genuine voter surge, and the systemic changes that have been occurring in Nigeria’s civic culture since the “Obidient” movement of 2023.

Others have noted that The Economist’s analysis implicitly indicts not just Tinubu but the structural features of Nigerian electoral democracy that make the paradox it describes possible: the influence of money, the weakness of civic information in the most deprived communities, the religious and ethnic identities that can override policy assessments, and the chronic inability of the opposition to unite around a single candidate.

All of that is fair — and all of it points to the same conclusion that the magazine’s headline already contains. Nigeria may be entering a presidential election in which the man most voters do not want may nonetheless be the man most likely to win.

That is not a story about Bola Tinubu. It is a story about Nigeria.

 

 

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