Tigrayan forces seize airports and push into Afar as former enemies TPLF, Fano and Oromo rebels unite against Abiy Ahmed; federal army answers with drones and counter-offensives while fighting spreads across northern Ethiopia and the 2022 Pretoria peace agreement faces its gravest test
By Atlantic Digest Africa Desk | Addis Ababa/Mekelle | September 27, 2026
Ethiopia is confronting its most dangerous internal military crisis since the end of the devastating Tigray war nearly four years ago, with Tigrayan forces seizing strategic airports, fighting their way into neighbouring Afar and operating alongside former enemies in Amhara as an extraordinary new coalition of armed groups declares its intention to remove Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government.
What began as months of deteriorating relations between Addis Ababa and Tigray has now become sustained warfare across three northern regions.
Tigrayan leaders themselves say they are in a “full-blown war” with the federal government.
Addis Ababa says it is responding to an offensive launched by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and its new allies.
Tigrayan authorities insist the opposite: that their forces entered a “defensive war” after repeated federal military aggression, drone attacks and violations of the 2022 Pretoria peace agreement.
Independent evidence does not yet establish responsibility for every stage of the escalation, but it establishes something more consequential: the agreement that stopped one of the deadliest wars of the 21st century is in severe danger of collapse.
The fighting dramatically escalated during the night of September 22-23 when Tigrayan forces took control of the airports at Mekelle, Axum and Shire, three of the most strategically important aviation facilities in Tigray. Ethiopian Airlines suspended services to the affected cities.
Almost simultaneously, Tigrayan forces moved beyond Tigray.
Fighting broke out across the border with Afar and along several axes leading into Amhara.
By Sunday, September 27, the Afar regional authorities acknowledged that Tigrayan forces had entered two administrative areas and taken control of three towns. Fighting was reported along an 80-90 kilometre front.
That expansion fundamentally changes the character of the conflict.
This is no longer simply another confrontation inside Tigray.
It is becoming a multi-regional war.
And behind the battlefield developments is one of the most remarkable political realignments in modern Ethiopian history.
The TPLF has joined forces with groups that only a few years ago were fighting against it.
The new organisation calls itself the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival.
It was formally announced on September 20 and brings together seven armed and political movements: the TPLF; the Amhara Fano National Movement; the Oromo Liberation Army, also known as OLF-Shane; the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front, or Ugugumo; a faction of the Ogaden National Liberation Front; the Benishangul People’s Liberation Front; and the Gumuz People’s Democratic Movement.
Their common objective is the removal of Abiy Ahmed’s government.
But their alliance is extraordinary because several of these movements have profoundly different political objectives and, in some cases, histories of fighting one another.
The most dramatic reconciliation is between the TPLF and Amhara Fano.
During the 2020-2022 Tigray war, Amhara forces fought alongside Abiy’s federal army against the TPLF.
Territorial disputes between Amhara and Tigray, particularly over Western Tigray and areas along their disputed boundary, were among the most bitter elements of that conflict.
Fano subsequently turned against Abiy’s government.
Since 2023, Amhara militants have been fighting federal forces in an insurgency that has killed thousands and forced Addis Ababa to maintain substantial military deployments across the region.
Former enemies have therefore found a new common enemy.
Federal forces.
Reuters has confirmed through government, diplomatic, humanitarian and rebel-linked sources that Tigrayan forces are now fighting alongside Fano elements in Amhara and alongside a local armed group in Afar.
That does not mean the seven-member alliance is operating as one integrated national army.
Indeed, that may become one of its greatest weaknesses.
ACLED assesses that only three components — Tigrayan forces, the Amhara Fano National Movement and Afar’s Ugugumo — are presently engaged directly in the northern fighting. The Oromo Liberation Army has indicated that its principal interest in the alliance is the removal of Abiy’s government rather than participation in a unified military campaign. There is also disagreement within the Ogaden movement itself over participation in the coalition.
The alliance is therefore politically significant but militarily uneven.
Its members agree on who they want removed.
They do not necessarily agree on what Ethiopia should look like afterwards.
For now, however, the immediate battlefield cooperation is real.
The Afar front — and why it could become the most dangerous
The expansion into Afar may ultimately prove more strategically important than the seizure of airports inside Tigray.
Afar occupies one of the most important pieces of geography in Ethiopia.
Landlocked Ethiopia depends overwhelmingly on neighbouring Djibouti for access to the sea. The principal Addis Ababa-Djibouti transport corridor carries most of the country’s international cargo and crucial fuel supplies.
That makes any sustained rebel expansion towards Afar’s transport infrastructure potentially dangerous not merely militarily but economically.
Tigrayan and allied Afar forces initially pushed across several axes.
Abala, roughly 50 kilometres east of Mekelle, became an early focus. Fighting was also reported around Erebti, Tonsa, Berahile and other locations.
Critical Threats reported that Ugugumo and Tigrayan forces captured Abala, while other claims that as many as five additional Afar towns had fallen could not initially be independently verified.
By Sunday, however, Afar officials themselves were acknowledging the loss of three towns.
The regional ruling-party chief, Mohamed Hussein, said Tigrayan forces had entered Areas 2 and 4 and appealed to the federal government to protect Afar residents.
This is important.
During the 2020-2022 war, Tigrayan forces also pushed into Afar.
A sufficiently deep advance could threaten transport links towards Djibouti.
There is not yet evidence that the main Addis-Djibouti corridor has been severed.
That distinction must be maintained.
But analysts are already examining whether rebel operations are designed to pressure the infrastructure supplying the federal government and the Ethiopian economy.
Edward Bach of Verisk Maplecroft told AFP that the alliance appears interested in capturing settlements around important infrastructure routes in order to undermine Addis Ababa’s ability to supply its forces.
For Ethiopia, the economic stakes are enormous.
A prolonged interruption of the Djibouti corridor could affect fuel, imported food, manufactured goods and export traffic.
That would transform a northern military crisis into a national economic emergency.
The Amhara front
The second major battlefield runs south from Tigray into Amhara.
Tigrayan forces and Fano fighters have clashed with the Ethiopian National Defence Force along several axes, including around the strategically important A2 highway between Alamata and Woldia.
Fighting has also been reported towards Sekota and around North Wollo.
By September 24, clashes had reached areas around Lalibela, the historic town whose rock-hewn churches are a UNESCO World Heritage Site.
Flights to Lalibela were suspended as fighting approached the area.
Residents began withdrawing cash.
Federal troops remained engaged outside the town.
ACLED reported fighting in Gazgibela in Wag Hemra and in Gidan, Lasta and Raya Kobo in North Wollo, involving federal troops and allied forces against Fano and Tigrayan fighters. A separate western front was also reported near the Tekeze River.
The federal government says its counter-offensive has inflicted heavy losses.
The Ethiopian military claimed that 272 Tigrayan fighters had been killed and about 260 wounded during operations in Amhara.
Those figures have not been independently verified.
They should therefore be treated as an Ethiopian military claim rather than an established casualty count.
The army subsequently said more than 500 enemy combatants had been killed, wounded or captured across the wider fighting.
Again, independent verification is unavailable.
What is clear is that the federal military retains an important technological advantage.
Drones.
Addis Ababa’s acquisition and extensive use of armed drones helped alter the balance during the previous Tigray war.
Federal forces now possess a substantially stronger drone capability than they had when the 2020 conflict began.
Drones have again been operating over northern Ethiopia.
Federal forces reportedly used one during fighting around Abala, while air and drone strikes have been reported elsewhere in Tigray and along the active fronts.
But drone warfare has already raised serious civilian-protection concerns.
Human Rights Watch investigated an August 20 Ethiopian airstrike on a residential compound in the Daero neighbourhood of Mekelle and said it found evidence consistent with an air-dropped general-purpose bomb.
Witnesses told the organisation that they saw no Tigrayan military presence at the compound before or after the strike.
Human Rights Watch has called on the Ethiopian military to comply with international humanitarian law and take all feasible precautions to protect civilians.
On September 21, a drone also struck an aid convoy in Tigray, drawing condemnation from the United States.
The European Union has condemned attacks affecting humanitarian operations and called for immediate de-escalation.
The return of drones has revived memories of the previous war.
So has another development.
The blackout.
Internet and telephone networks across much of Tigray were disrupted on Friday.
Calls on state-owned Ethio telecom largely stopped connecting, while some Safaricom services remained available.
NetBlocks confirmed the disruption.
But an important complication emerged: four sources cited by Reuters said the TPLF itself had ordered telecom operators to shut networks, possibly in an effort to reduce the federal military’s ability to exploit mobile networks for battlefield drone operations.
That means the present communications blackout cannot simply be attributed to Addis Ababa without qualification.
Whatever its cause, the consequences for civilians are serious.
The blackout makes it more difficult for families to contact one another, aid agencies to operate and journalists to independently verify battlefield claims.
It also makes misinformation easier.
Civilians remember what happened last time
In Mekelle, residents have begun stockpiling food and withdrawing cash.
In Adigrat, residents told Reuters that shops were emptying and essential medicines were becoming scarce and extraordinarily expensive.
People fear the return of siege conditions.
Those fears are not abstract.
The previous Tigray war began in November 2020 after years of deteriorating relations between Abiy’s government and the TPLF.
Federal forces entered Tigray.
Eritrean troops crossed the border and fought alongside Ethiopia.
Amhara forces joined the campaign.
Tigrayan forces later counterattacked and advanced south towards Addis Ababa before the military balance changed.
The African Union estimates that approximately 600,000 people died through combat, hunger and the collapse of healthcare during the conflict.
The war formally ended with the Pretoria Agreement of November 2, 2022.
The agreement was supposed to produce a permanent cessation of hostilities, disarmament and demobilisation of Tigrayan forces, restoration of federal authority, humanitarian access and a political settlement.
But crucial issues were never fully resolved.
Eritrea was not a party to the agreement.
Amhara forces were not a party.
Western Tigray remained disputed.
Large numbers of displaced people were unable to return home.
Tigrayan disarmament remained incomplete.
And the relationship between Addis Ababa and the TPLF gradually deteriorated again.
The warning signs accumulated through 2026.
Fighting occurred around disputed territories.
Tigrayan forces mobilised.
Federal drone strikes increased.
In August, clashes erupted near Ethiopia’s border with Sudan.
By September, heavy weapons, including tanks and artillery, were reportedly being deployed in southern Tigray.
Then came the September 20 announcement of the seven-group anti-Abiy alliance.
Two days later, the military escalation began.
This is why the current conflict cannot be understood simply as the sudden collapse of a successful peace agreement.
Pretoria stopped mass warfare.
It did not resolve all the political, territorial and security disputes that produced it.
Eritrea returns to the equation
The most dangerous external variable is Eritrea.
During the previous Tigray war, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki was Abiy Ahmed’s military ally.
Eritrean troops fought the TPLF and were accused by human-rights organisations and witnesses of grave abuses.
That relationship has changed dramatically.
Relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara have deteriorated amid Ethiopia’s renewed insistence on reliable access to the Red Sea.
Eritrea fears that Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions could eventually become territorial.
At the same time, Addis Ababa accuses Eritrea of financing and supporting armed Ethiopian groups opposed to Abiy.
On Sunday, Ethiopian Army Chief of Staff Field Marshal Berhanu Jula publicly accused Eritrea of helping forces seeking to weaken Ethiopia.
Eritrea denies supporting the armed groups.
That accusation creates the possibility of something almost unimaginable four years ago:
the TPLF and Eritrea finding themselves, directly or indirectly, on the same side against Abiy’s government.
There have been reports of contacts between TPLF figures and Eritrean officials.
But evidence of the extent of operational cooperation remains limited, and Eritrea denies Addis Ababa’s allegations.
It would therefore be premature to describe Eritrea as formally participating in the new war.
The risk is nevertheless enormous.
If Eritrea becomes directly involved, the conflict ceases to be merely an Ethiopian civil war.
It becomes an interstate Horn of Africa confrontation.
And it would unfold beside another major war in Sudan.
The Abiy government is stronger — but more stretched
The military balance is different from 2020.
Abiy’s government possesses a larger drone arsenal.
Its military has years of combat experience.
The federal army is estimated by some analysts to number around 500,000 personnel and enjoys relationships with external partners, including the United Arab Emirates.
The TPLF, meanwhile, has suffered internal divisions.
Some senior Tigrayan officials have defected or fallen out with the current leadership.
ACLED reports that the head of Tigray’s police and a senior TPLF figure defected to the federal side on September 23, while internal disputes have affected senior military commanders.
But Addis Ababa has a different weakness.
It is fighting too many conflicts.
Federal forces have been battling Fano in Amhara.
They have confronted the Oromo Liberation Army.
There are security problems elsewhere in the federation.
Relations with Eritrea are deteriorating.
Sudan remains unstable along Ethiopia’s western frontier.
And now Tigray has reopened as a major military theatre.
The new rebel alliance appears designed to exploit precisely that vulnerability.
Its members do not necessarily need to create a unified army capable of marching into Addis Ababa.
If simultaneous insurgencies force the federal government to disperse troops, drones, logistics and political attention across a country of more than 120 million people, the coalition can impose enormous costs without winning a conventional military victory.
That appears to be one of the alliance’s strategic calculations.
But the alliance faces a mirror-image problem.
Its members distrust one another.
TPLF and Fano fought a brutal war against each other.
Territorial disputes between Amhara and Tigray have not disappeared.
The Oromo Liberation Army has objectives rooted in Oromo nationalism.
Afar groups have their own regional interests.
The Ogaden movement contains competing factions.
A coalition united primarily by opposition to Abiy may struggle to agree on Ethiopia’s political order if it ever succeeds.
That contradiction could eventually break the alliance apart.
For now, common opposition to Addis Ababa is holding at least part of it together.
Washington and Brussels sound the alarm
International reaction has been unusually rapid.
The African Union has called for immediate de-escalation and direct negotiations.
The European Union says the situation is deteriorating rapidly and has urged both sides to recommit to the Pretoria agreement.
It specifically cited the TPLF takeover of the Mekelle, Axum and Shire airports and federal drone strikes as causes for concern.
The United States has taken a sharper position towards the TPLF.
US Ambassador Ervin Massinga accused its leadership of entering an “unwinnable fight” and urged political dialogue. Washington had already imposed sanctions on TPLF leadership in June, according to Reuters.
The diplomatic urgency reflects the wider geography.
To Ethiopia’s west, Sudan is at war.
To its north, relations with Eritrea are dangerous.
To its northeast lies the Red Sea, already destabilised by the wider Middle East conflict and attacks on maritime traffic.
To the east is Djibouti, through which Ethiopia’s economic lifeline passes.
A major Ethiopian war would therefore not remain an Ethiopian problem for long.
It could send refugees across borders, interrupt trade corridors, destabilise Djibouti, deepen Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions and further strain a Horn of Africa already managing the Sudan war, Somalia’s security crisis and Red Sea instability.
What happens next
Three developments will determine whether the present fighting remains a serious regional conflict or becomes another catastrophic Ethiopian civil war.
The first is Afar.
If Tigrayan and allied forces continue advancing towards strategically important transport corridors, Addis Ababa will almost certainly treat the front as an existential economic threat.
The second is Amhara.
If Tigrayan forces and Fano can sustain genuine battlefield cooperation despite their bitter territorial disputes, the federal army could face a much larger northern front than it confronted during much of the previous war.
The third is Eritrea.
If Asmara remains outside the fighting, the conflict may remain primarily internal.
If Eritrea intervenes directly or becomes a substantial supplier to anti-Abiy forces, the strategic calculation changes dramatically.
There is also a fourth variable:
the coalition itself.
The Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival looks formidable on paper because it joins armed organisations operating across several regions.
But a list of seven groups is not the same thing as seven armies operating under unified command.
At present, the clearest coordinated battlefield activity involves the TPLF, Fano and Afar rebels.
Whether the Oromo Liberation Army and other members open significant fronts could determine how badly stretched the federal military becomes.
For ordinary Ethiopians, however, strategic calculations offer little comfort.
Flights have stopped.
Roads are threatened.
Communications are disappearing.
Food and medicines are becoming harder to find in parts of Tigray.
People are withdrawing cash.
Drones are again flying overhead.
Families that survived the last war are once again preparing for siege.
And Ethiopian soldiers and Tigrayan fighters who were supposed to have ended their war in Pretoria four years ago are again killing one another.
Neither side has produced independently verifiable evidence establishing all of its battlefield claims.
The TPLF says it is defending Tigray from federal aggression.
Addis Ababa says the TPLF and its allies launched an offensive designed to overthrow Ethiopia’s constitutional government.
The federal military says hundreds of rebels have been killed.
The rebel coalition claims territorial advances.
Some towns have changed hands.
Others remain contested.
The communications blackout makes independent verification increasingly difficult.
But one fact no longer requires interpretation.
The peace that ended the 2020-2022 Tigray war has been gravely breached.
Tigrayan forces have seized airports.
Federal drones are back in the sky.
Fighting has crossed into Afar and Amhara.
Former enemies have formed an alliance against Abiy Ahmed.
And Ethiopia, a country that lost hundreds of thousands of people the last time these forces went to war, is again approaching the question it hoped the Pretoria agreement had permanently answered:
Can its political conflicts still be settled without another national war?
Six days into the latest offensive, the answer is becoming dangerously uncertain.
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