November 6, 2026

33 governors, 103 million voters: Tinubu’s camp bets on the powerful, Makinde bets on the hungry

The Atlantic Digest

Nigeria · Africa · The world

Saturday, 17 October 2026  ·  atlanticdigest.com

Special report · Nigeria 2027

Governors or the governed? Onanuga’s ’33 governors’ boast meets Makinde’s bet on the people as the 2027 race takes shape

The Presidency says the backing of 33 of 36 state governors proves President Tinubu is on course for a second term. Oyo’s governor, now the APM presidential candidate, says the election will be decided by hungry voters, not state chief executives. The record of the last three elections, the arithmetic of 2023 and the state of the field suggest both men are only partly right.

The Atlantic Digest  ·  Abuja  ·  Saturday, 17 October 2026

ABUJA — Ninety-one days before Nigerians choose a president, the 2027 campaign has resolved into a contest between two theories of how Nigerian elections are won. The first came from the President’s Special Adviser on Information and Strategy, Bayo Onanuga, who said in a post on Friday that thirty-three governors cannot be wrong in backing President Bola Tinubu. The second has been pressed all week by Oyo State Governor Seyi Makinde, the Allied Peoples Movement’s presidential candidate, and his campaign. Their argument is that the President’s opponents are not politicians at all but tens of millions of struggling voters. Which theory holds will decide the election on 16 January 2027.

Onanuga’s intervention was a response to television, not to Makinde. Reacting to an Arise TV clip in which a member of the APC campaign’s media committee was pressed on the economy, he accused broadcasters of parroting the opposition. “TV anchors keep pushing the opposition’s narrative that nothing has changed,” he wrote. He then listed the evidence he says shows Nigeria is better off under Tinubu. A bag of rice that once sold for about ₦120,000 now costs below ₦50,000, and ₦45,000 in his hometown. Foreign reserves are approaching $60 billion. Businesses can again buy foreign exchange to import raw materials. Nigerians can use naira cards abroad, and foreign direct investment, not just portfolio money, is returning. The backing of 33 governors, he said, reflected confidence in the President’s record.

Some of these claims are supported by official data and some are not. The National Bureau of Statistics reported this week that headline inflation fell to 14.63 per cent in September, its fourth monthly decline, and that food prices fell 1.55 per cent in the month. Foreign reserves have risen sharply. But food inflation remains near 20 per cent year on year, petrol sells above ₦1,400 a litre, and the general price level is roughly 39 per cent higher than two years ago. The Nigeria Labour Congress is threatening strike action over a minimum wage it says has lost most of its value. Onanuga’s rice prices and investment claims were not accompanied by sources, and The Atlantic Digest has not been able to verify them.

Onanuga did not name the 33 governors, and the figure is best read as a political claim rather than a count. Nigeria has 36 state governors. Following a wave of defections from the Peoples Democratic Party since 2025, including the governors of Delta, Akwa Ibom, Enugu, Bayelsa, Plateau and Taraba, the All Progressives Congress now controls roughly 28 states. Several governors outside the APC have moved into the President’s orbit. Anambra’s Charles Soludo of APGA and Osun’s Ademola Adeleke of Accord have both been named coordinators of the APC presidential campaign. On The Atlantic Digest’s reading, the three governors outside Onanuga’s count are most likely Makinde himself; Bauchi’s Bala Mohammed, one of the few opposition governors who has consistently resisted the President; and Abia’s Alex Otti of the Labour Party, who has avoided criticising Tinubu but has not endorsed him. The Presidency has not confirmed this.

Makinde’s answer has been consistent. In remarks to Vanguard this week, his campaign’s media adviser, Anthony Ehilebo, said the contest was “the APC versus Nigerians”, not Tinubu against the opposition’s leading figures. He pointed to the 49.7 per cent of Nigerians the campaign says live in extreme multidimensional poverty as the voters the APC will meet at the polling units. Makinde himself went further on Friday, at a consultation on Oyo’s 2027 budget at the University of Ibadan. He alleged that the federal government had spent about ₦9 trillion in Nigeria LNG dividends due to the 36 states, roughly ₦250 billion each, and had told governors the money would be paid only after the election. “Is the election more important than the people of Nigeria?” he asked. The implication was pointed: governors’ loyalty, in his telling, is partly purchased, and does not transfer to their voters. The Presidency had not responded to the allegation when this report went to press, and it has not been independently verified.

It is not a new argument for Makinde. In May 2025, as PDP governors began defecting to the APC, he told party loyalists in Ibadan that the PDP would not be troubled by defections “until hunger defects” to the ruling party, and that the hungry majority would decide 2027. The line has become the organising idea of his campaign, which is running as the Makinde/Daura Presidential Campaign Organisation and promises a single four-year transitional government of national unity.

History offers some support to both men, and a warning to each. In 2015, President Goodluck Jonathan entered the election as the PDP incumbent, with his party still controlling more states than any other, although five PDP governors had defected to the APC in late 2013. He lost to Muhammadu Buhari by 15.42 million votes to 12.85 million. It was the first defeat of a sitting president at the polls, and it showed that a governors’ majority could not save an unpopular incumbent. In 2019, Buhari won re-election with the APC controlling a majority of states, taking about 15.19 million votes to Atiku Abubakar’s 11.26 million; there, governors and outcome were aligned. In 2023, Tinubu inherited an APC that controlled more than 20 states, yet he won with just 36.6 per cent of the vote. He also lost several APC-governed states outright: Lagos, his own base, went to Peter Obi; Kaduna and Katsina went to Atiku; and Kano went to Rabiu Kwankwaso. Meanwhile, he carried Rivers, Oyo and Benue, states controlled by PDP governors of the so-called G5 who had broken with their own party to help him. The lesson is that governors matter at the margin, especially in turning out votes and protecting results, but they cannot override a strong current of public opinion. Their influence has also proved weakest in large, urban, media-saturated states.

The 2023 arithmetic frames everything that follows. Tinubu won with 8,794,726 votes. Atiku, then of the PDP, polled 6,984,520, Obi of the Labour Party 6,101,533, and Kwankwaso of the NNPP 1,496,687. Fewer than 27 per cent of the 93.4 million registered voters cast a ballot. The combined votes of Atiku and Obi, about 13.1 million, comfortably exceeded Tinubu’s total. That fact has driven three years of failed attempts to build a single opposition ticket. The Supreme Court upheld Tinubu’s victory in October 2023, dismissing petitions by both Atiku and Obi. But the election left lasting doubts. The failure of INEC’s result-viewing portal to show presidential results in real time, which the commission blamed on a technical glitch, damaged public trust in the process.

Both of Tinubu’s main 2023 challengers are back, on different platforms and with different partners. Atiku, who will be 80 by polling day, is the candidate of the African Democratic Congress with the former Rivers governor and transport minister Rotimi Amaechi as his running mate. Obi has moved to the Nigeria Democratic Congress and, crucially, has Kwankwaso as his running mate. That pairing merges two of 2023’s opposition blocs and could swing Kano, the state with the second-largest number of registered voters. But it also deepens the rivalry with Atiku’s camp. This week Kwankwaso urged Atiku to step aside for Obi, and Atiku’s campaign called the demand reckless and accused Kwankwaso of serving the President’s interests.

The Economist captured the resulting paradox in a report published on 1 October. Its argument was that Nigerians may dislike their president but could re-elect him anyway. The magazine did not claim Tinubu was popular. It argued that the structure of the contest favours him: an incumbent with the ruling party’s machinery and patronage, facing a fragmented opposition in which the anti-APC vote is split between Atiku and Obi. “That anti-APC vote is not coalesced into a single vote,” the risk analyst Joachim MacEbong of Control Risks told the magazine. It also pointed to a Muslim-Muslim ticket that may resonate in the vote-rich North, identity politics in parts of the South including Lagos, and a cynicism among many voters who no longer expect much from government. On that reading, discontent is real but may show up as low turnout rather than a vote against the President. The Presidency rejected the report. Sunday Dare, the President’s special adviser on media and public communications, called its portrayal of Nigerians rejecting Tinubu “an intellectual fraud” and listed the administration’s reforms.

Published polling offers little clarity. The most widely reported recent survey, the Oxford-Metro Analytics National Trust Poll closed on 7 September, put Tinubu on 35.41 per cent, Obi on 33.86 per cent and Atiku on 26.67 per cent. Makinde drew just 519 of 69,110 responses. But the poll was an online exercise in which Lagos and the Federal Capital Territory accounted for more than half of all responses, and it published no weighting or margin of error. It cannot be treated as representative. An online poll by the Tinubu Must Go movement put Atiku ahead, but it was run by an openly partisan group. No independent, methodologically transparent national poll has yet been published for this cycle.

Across the six geopolitical zones, the shape of the contest is clearer than the outcome. INEC’s final register contains 103.4 million voters. Lagos (7.49 million), Kano (6.57 million), Kaduna (4.66 million), Katsina (3.88 million), Rivers (3.74 million) and Oyo (3.59 million) are the largest prizes. In the South-West, Tinubu remains the favourite. But he lost Lagos in 2023 and Osun to Atiku, and Makinde’s candidacy threatens to take a significant share of Oyo, the zone’s second-largest state, which the governor helped deliver to Tinubu last time. The South-East is likely to remain Obi’s stronghold, as it was in 2023 when he won every state in the zone. The South-South is genuinely contested: Obi led much of it in 2023, but the defection of the governors of Delta, Akwa Ibom and Bayelsa to the APC, Wike’s alliance with the President in Rivers, and Duke’s candidacy in his native Cross River all complicate the picture.

The North-Central, where Tinubu won Benue, Kogi, Kwara and Niger in 2023 and Obi took Plateau, Nasarawa and the FCT, is likely to remain a three-way battleground shaped by insecurity and the cost of living. The North-West, the largest zone by registered voters, will be decisive. Atiku won Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi and Sokoto in 2023; Tinubu took Jigawa and Zamfara; and Kwankwaso carried Kano. Kwankwaso’s presence on Obi’s ticket and the APC’s grip on most of the zone’s governments make it the hardest region to call. The North-East, Atiku’s home zone, delivered most of its states to him in 2023, with Borno, Vice President Shettima’s home state, going to Tinubu. Atiku will expect to dominate again, though insecurity and displacement may depress turnout. To win outright, a candidate needs the most votes and at least 25 per cent in two-thirds of the states. That requirement still favours candidates with genuinely national spread.

Measured against that test, each of the five leading candidates brings clear strengths and weaknesses. Tinubu’s strengths are incumbency, the APC’s machinery, the backing of most governors, a record of macroeconomic stabilisation that international lenders have praised, and a strong South-West base. His weaknesses are the hardship that followed subsidy removal and the naira float, persistent insecurity, questions about his health and visibility made sharper by his decision not to join every campaign rally, and the Muslim-Muslim ticket’s limited appeal among Christian voters in the South and Middle Belt. Atiku brings a national network built over three decades, deep northern support and a reformist economic message, but faces questions about his age, a sixth presidential run, and an open feud with the Obi–Kwankwaso camp that splits the opposition. Obi retains intense support among young, urban and southern voters and has added Kwankwaso’s Kano base, but must still overcome scepticism in much of the North and the absence of a governor-led structure.

Makinde brings a credible record as a two-term governor, a clear reform message, and strength in Oyo and parts of the South-West. Against him are a small party with limited national reach, a late start, and polling that suggests minimal national recognition. Donald Duke of the PRP, the former Cross River governor, has a reputation as a reforming administrator and a sharp policy offer, including a proposal to cut petrol to about ₦300 a litre. But his party is small, his support base is concentrated in the South-South, and he has himself warned that a divided opposition will hand Tinubu victory.

Why has Makinde, who backed Tinubu in 2023 as one of the G5 PDP governors alongside Nyesom Wike, Samuel Ortom, Ifeanyi Ugwuanyi and Okezie Ikpeazu, turned against him? His own account rests on three grievances. The first is broken promises. He says he supported Tinubu on the understanding that the new government would be one of national unity, and that this never materialised; only Wike, of the G5, received an appointment. In a radio interview this week he also revealed that the President passed over his nominee for Oyo’s ministerial slot. The second is the fate of his party. When Wike declared in December 2025 that he would deliver the PDP for Tinubu, Makinde broke publicly. “So, Wike can support the president in 2027, but I will not,” he said, framing his stance as a defence of multiparty democracy against drift towards a one-party state.

The third grievance is the PDP’s own collapse. Makinde’s faction lost a legal battle for control of the party to Wike’s camp, and the Supreme Court nullified the November 2025 Ibadan convention at which his allies had elected a new national leadership. With the PDP’s structures beyond his control, he declared his presidential bid on 14 May 2026 at a joint PDP–APM rally in Ibadan, on the APM platform, through an alliance memorandum with the APM’s national chairman. It was as much a route around the PDP’s crisis as a choice of party.

Is Makinde a spoiler? The evidence suggests he may be, but in an unpredictable direction. He is very unlikely to win outright: his national polling is negligible and his party lacks the reach to secure 25 per cent of the vote in 24 states. But in the South-West he could reduce Tinubu’s margins, particularly in Oyo. Every vote he takes from the President’s base narrows the gap the opposition must close elsewhere. At the same time, his candidacy fragments the anti-Tinubu vote further, the very division The Economist identified as the President’s best asset. Makinde himself rejects the idea that the opposition cannot unite, and some in his camp see his candidacy as leverage for a later alliance. Whether he ends as kingmaker, spoiler or simply a voice for the South-West’s discontent will depend on whether the opposition consolidates before January.

Underlying all of this is the question many Nigerians ask first: will the result reflect their votes? The record is mixed. The 2015 election produced Nigeria’s first peaceful transfer of power from a sitting president to an opposition candidate and remains the benchmark. In 2019 and 2023, low turnout, vote buying, violence in some areas and technical failures left large parts of the electorate disillusioned. In 2023 the failure to upload presidential results to the portal in real time undermined confidence in a system that had promised transparency. The courts upheld the outcome, but trust did not recover. The Economist’s point about cynicism is, in part, a description of that loss of faith.

The new legal framework raises the bar for INEC. The Electoral Act 2026 makes electronic transmission of polling-unit results to the result-viewing portal mandatory under Section 60(3), with penalties for officials who frustrate it. It also makes biometric accreditation through the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System compulsory, and requires polls to be rerun within 24 hours where devices fail and the result could affect the outcome. INEC’s chairman, Professor Joash Amupitan, says the commission has completed 10 of its 14 timetable activities, procured more BVAS machines and is upgrading its cybersecurity, while complaining that the National Assembly breached some timelines. But the commission begins the cycle under scrutiny, having this month omitted three prominent governorship candidates from its final lists without published reasons. Nigerians should expect, at a minimum, results visible at polling-unit level as they are counted, prompt publication of the reasons for every exclusion and cancellation, and a security deployment that protects voters without intimidating them. They should also expect that no part of the country is left without a credible vote because of insecurity.

In the end, Onanuga and Makinde are each half right. Governors matter: they shape turnout, mobilise local machines and, too often, influence what happens to results after the polls close. Thirty-three of them are a formidable asset for any incumbent. But 2015 showed that governors cannot carry an unpopular president, and 2023 showed that they cannot always deliver even their own states. Makinde is right that the decisive force is the electorate. But The Economist’s warning is that an angry electorate that stays at home, or splits its anger between several challengers, changes nothing. The real question for January is not whether Nigerians are discontented. It is whether that discontent will turn out to vote, and in which direction, and whether INEC will count it faithfully.