High-level negotiations between the United States and Iran in Islamabad ended without even a preliminary understanding after more than 20 hours of talks, though both sides have stopped short of declaring an immediate return to full-scale war, leaving a fragile equilibrium in place that may prove increasingly difficult to sustain . Vice President JD Vance and Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf both avoided ruling out further engagement, reflecting the high stakes involved and the recognition that neither Tehran nor Washington currently appears eager to escalate into open conflict despite the breakdown . Both sides have blamed the other for the collapse, with Vance stating that Tehran “chose not to accept our terms” while Iranian officials accused the US of making “maximalist and unlawful demands” . At the same time, both sides continue to adhere to maximalist positions, each convinced it holds the upper hand and can dictate the terms of any eventual agreement .
Three core issues appear to have blocked progress at the negotiating table. First, Iran’s insistence on maintaining control over the Strait of Hormuz, which Tehran views not just as a bargaining chip but as its most credible enforcement guarantee for any future agreement, particularly given the unreliability of US commitments under President Donald Trump . Second, Washington’s continued insistence on its pre-war demands regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, namely zero enrichment inside Iran and the transfer of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium abroad, which Tehran continues to reject as unacceptable . Third, Iran’s insistence on linking any agreement to broader regional dynamics, particularly involving Lebanon, and rejecting any deal that is not comprehensive across all fronts . From Tehran’s perspective, the United States is attempting to achieve diplomatically what it failed to secure militarily—eliminating Iran’s nuclear assets and dismantling its regional network—and now faces a new structural challenge in the persistent disruption of the Strait of Hormuz .
In response to the collapse of talks, President Trump announced a naval blockade targeting Iran’s oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, with US Central Command pledging to begin the blockade of “all maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports” . However, in Iran, this threat is widely seen as operationally challenging to implement, as enforcing a blockade would require US forces to operate closer to Iranian shores, significantly increasing their exposure to drone and missile attacks . Mine-clearing operations and maritime enforcement would face similar vulnerabilities, and intercepting vessels linked to China, for example, would lead to major escalation risks, further undermining the credibility of the blockade . Iranian officials are also increasingly concerned about the risk of targeted strikes against senior leadership, with a growing perception that Israel may seek to exploit the current moment to carry out decapitation operations once again, particularly given the visibility of senior figures during the Islamabad talks .
In Tehran, skepticism toward negotiations remains visible, particularly among hardliners who interpret the talks as a delaying tactic by the United States and Israel to buy time and prepare for a more decisive round of military action . A growing strand of analysis suggests that if war resumes, Iran may abandon its previous strategy of attrition and instead pursue a more concentrated and escalatory approach aimed at forcing a rapid conclusion, including closing both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait through the Houthis, alongside expanding its missile target set against Israel . Many Iranian analysts assess that the likelihood of renewed conflict is now higher than the chances of the ceasefire holding, with Israel widely seen as likely to resume military operations following the collapse of talks . Ultimately, the situation is being framed in Tehran in binary terms: either a comprehensive ceasefire holds across all fronts, or any return to hostilities will escalate into a wider regional confrontation, with Iran increasingly clear that it will not distinguish between the United States and Israel in any renewed conflict .
